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Optimal Expectations
By MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER AND JONATHAN A. PARKER*
Forward-looking agents care about expected future utility ﬂows, and hence have
higher current felicity if they are optimistic. This paper studies utility-based biases
in beliefs by supposing that beliefs maximize average felicity, optimally balancing
this beneﬁt of optimism against the costs of worse decision making. A small
optimistic bias in beliefs typically leads to ﬁrst-order gains in anticipatory utility
and only second-order costs in realized outcomes. In a portfolio choice example,
investors overestimate their return and exhibit a preference for skewness; in general
equilibrium, investors’ prior beliefs are endogenously heterogeneous. In a con-
sumption-saving example, consumers are both overconﬁdent and overoptimistic.
(JEL D1, D8, E21, G11, G12)
Modern psychology views human behavior
as a complex interaction of cognitive and emo-
tional responses to external stimuli that some-
times results in dysfunctional outcomes.
Modern economics takes a relatively simple
view of human behavior as governed by unlim-
ited cognitive ability applied to a small number
of concrete goals and unencumbered by emo-
tion. The central models of economics allow
coherent analysis of behavior and economic
policy, but eliminate “dysfunctional” outcomes,
and in particular the possibility that individuals
might persistently err in attaining their goals.
One area in which there is substantial evidence
that individuals do consistently err is in the
assessment of probabilities. In particular, agents
often overestimate the probability of good out-
comes, such as their success (Marc Alpert and
Howard Raiffa, 1982; Neil D. Weinstein, 1980;
and Roger Buehler et al., 1994).
We provide a structural model of subjective
beliefs in which agents hold incorrect but opti-
mal beliefs. These optimal beliefs differ from
objective beliefs in ways that match many of the
claims in the psychology literature about “irra-
tional” behavior. Further, in the canonical eco-
nomic models that we study, these beliefs lead
to economic behaviors that match observed out-
comes that have puzzled the economics litera-
ture based on rational behavior and common
priors. Our approach has three main elements.
First, at any instant people care about current
utility ﬂow and expected future utility ﬂows.
While it is standard that agents who care about
expected future utility plan for the future, forward-
looking agents have higher current felicity if
they are optimistic about the future. For exam-
ple, agents who care about expected future util-
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1092ity ﬂows are happier if they overestimate the
probability that their investments pay off well or
their future labor income is high.
The second crucial element of our model is
that such optimism affects decisions and wors-
ens outcomes. Distorted beliefs distort actions.
For example, an agent cannot derive utility from
optimistically believing that she will be rich
tomorrow, while basing her consumption-saving
decision on rational beliefs about future income.
How are these forces balanced? We assume
that subjective beliefs maximize the agent’s ex-
pected well-being, deﬁned as the time-average
of expected felicity over all periods. This third
key element leads to a balance between the ﬁrst
two—the beneﬁts of optimism and the costs of
basing actions on distorted expectations.
We illustrate our theory of optimal expecta-
tions using three examples. In general, a small
bias in beliefs typically leads to ﬁrst-order gains
due to increased anticipatory utility and only to
second-order costs due to distorted behavior.
Thus, beliefs tend toward optimism—states
with greater utility ﬂows are perceived as more
likely. Further, optimal expectations are less
rational when biases have little cost in realized
outcomes and when biases have large beneﬁts in
terms of expected future happiness.
More speciﬁcally, in a portfolio choice prob-
lem, agents overestimate the return on their
investment and prefer skewed returns. Hence,
agents can be risk-loving when investing in
lottery-type assets and at the same time risk-
averse when investing in nonskewed assets.
Second, in general equilibrium, agents’ prior
beliefs are endogenously heterogeneous and
agents gamble against each other. We show in
an example that the expected return on the risky
asset is higher than in an economy populated by
agents with rational beliefs if the return is neg-
atively skewed. Third, in a consumption-saving
problem with quadratic utility and stochastic
income, agents are overconﬁdent and overopti-
mistic; early in life they consume more than
implied by rational beliefs.
Optimal expectations matches other observed
behavior. In a portfolio choice problem, Chris-
tian Gollier (2005) shows that optimal expecta-
tions imply subjective probabilities that focus
on the best and worst state. This pattern of
probability weighting is similar to that assumed
by cumulative prospect theory to match ob-
served behavior (see Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
1992). Finally, Brunnermeier and Parker (2002)
show in a different economic setting that agents
with optimal expectations can exhibit a greater
readiness to accept commitment, regret, and a
context effect in which nonchosen actions can
affect utility.
Psychological theories provide many chan-
nels through which the human mind is able to
hold beliefs inconsistent with the rational pro-
cessing of objective data. First, to the extent that
people are more likely to remember better out-
comes, they will perceive them as more likely in
the future, leading to optimistic biases in beliefs
as in our optimal expectations framework.
1 Sec-
ond, most human behavior is not based on con-
scious cognition, but is automatic, processed
only in the limbic system and not the prefrontal
cortex (John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand,
1999). If automatic processing is optimistic,
then the agent may naturally approach problems
with optimistic biases. However, the agent may
also choose to apply cognition to discipline
belief biases when the stakes are large, as in our
optimal expectations framework.
Our model of beliefs differs markedly from
treatments of risk in economics. While early
models in macroeconomics specify beliefs ex-
ogenously as naive, myopic, or partially up-
dated (e.g., Marc Nerlove, 1958), since John F.
Muth (1960, 1961) and Robert E. Lucas, Jr.
(1976), nearly all research has proceeded under
the rational expectations assumption that sub-
jective and objective beliefs coincide. There are
two main arguments for this. First, the alterna-
tives to rationality lack discipline. But our
model provides precisely this discipline for sub-
jective beliefs by specifying an objective for
beliefs. The second argument is that agents have
the incentive to hold rational beliefs (or act as if
they do) because these expectations make
agents as well off as they can be. However, this
rationale for rational expectations relies upon
agents caring about the future but at the same
time having their expectations about the future
1 In Sendhil Mullainathan (2002), individuals have im-
perfect recall and form expectations as if they did not. In
Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein (1997), individuals
understand that they have imperfect recall, and in B. Doug-
las Bernheim and Raphael Thomadsen (2005), individuals
additionally can inﬂuence the memory process to increase
anticipatory utility.
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inconsistent. Our approach takes into account
the fact that agents care in the present about
utility ﬂows that are expected in the future in
deﬁning what beliefs are optimal.
Most microeconomic models assume that
agents share common prior beliefs. This “Har-
sanyi doctrine” is weaker than the assumption
of rational expectations that all agents’ prior
beliefs are equal to the objective probabilities
governing equilibrium dynamics. But like ratio-
nal expectations, the common priors assumption
is quite restrictive and does not allow agents to
“agree to disagree” (Robert Aumann, 1976).
Leonard J. Savage (1954) provides axiomatic
foundations for a more general theory in which
agents hold arbitrary prior beliefs, so agents can
agree to disagree. But if beliefs can be arbitrary,
theory provides little structure or predictive
power. The theory of optimal expectations pro-
vides discipline to the study of subjective be-
liefs and heterogeneous priors. Framed in this
way, optimal expectations is a theory of prior
beliefs for Bayesian rational agents.
The key assumption that agents derive
current felicity from expectations of future
pleasures has its roots in the origins of utilitar-
ianism. Detailed expositions on anticipatory
utility can be found in the work of Bentham,
Hume, Bo ¨hm-Barwerk, and other early econo-
mists. More recently, the temporal elements of
the utility concept have reemerged in research at
the juncture of psychology and economics
(George Loewenstein, 1987; Kahneman et al.,
1997; Kahneman, 2000), and have been incor-
porated formally into economic models in the
form of belief-dependent utility by John Geana-
koplos et al. (1989), Andrew J. Caplin and John
Leahy (2001), and Leeat Yariv (2001).
2
Several papers in economics study related
models in which forward-looking agents distort
beliefs. In particular, George Akerlof and Wil-
liam T. Dickens (1982) model agents as choos-
ing beliefs to minimize their discomfort from
fear of bad outcomes. In a two-period model,
agents with rational beliefs choose an industry
to work in, understanding that in the second
period they will distort their beliefs about the
hazards of their work and perhaps not invest in
safety technology. Second, Augustin Landier
(2000) studies a two-period game in which
agents choose a prior before receiving a signal
and subsequently taking an action based on their
updated beliefs. Unlike our approach, belief dy-
namics are not Bayesian; common to our ap-
proach, agents tend to save less and be
optimistic about portfolio returns.
3 Third, time-
inconsistent preferences can make it optimal to
strategically ignore information (Juan D. Car-
rillo and Thomas Mariotti, 2000) or distort be-
liefs (Roland Be ´nabou and Jean Tirole, 2002,
2004). In the latter, unlike in our model, multi-
ple selves play intra-personal games with im-
perfect recall, and actions serve as signals to
future selves. Similarly, concerns about self-
reputations also play a central role in Richmond
Harbaugh (2002). Finally, there is a large liter-
ature on bounded rationality and incomplete
memory. Some of these models suggest mech-
anisms for how individuals achieve optimal ex-
pectations in the face of possibly contradictory
data.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In
Section I we introduce and discuss the general
optimal expectations framework. In Sections II
through IV we use the optimal expectations
framework to study behavior in three different
canonical economic settings. Section II studies
a two-period, two-asset portfolio choice prob-
lem and shows that agents are biased toward the
belief that their investments will pay off well
and prefer positively skewed payouts. Section
III shows that in a two-agent economy of this
type with no aggregate risk, optimal expecta-
tions are heterogeneous and agents gamble
against one another. Section IV analyzes the
consumption-saving problem of an agent with
quadratic utility receiving stochastic labor in-
come over time, and shows that the agent is
biased toward optimism and is overconﬁdent,
and so saves less than a rational agent. Section
V concludes. The Appendix contains proofs of
all propositions.
2 Caplin and Leahy (2004) and Kﬁr Eliaz and Ran
Spiegler (2003) show that the forward-looking nature of
utility raises problems for the revealed preference approach
to behavior and the expected utility framework in the con-
text of the acquisition of information.
3 Also, in Erik Eyster (2002), Matthew Rabin and Joel L.
Schrag (1999), and Yariv (2002), agents distort beliefs to be
consistent with past choices or beliefs.
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We choose to maintain many of the assump-
tions of canonical economic theory: agents op-
timize knowing the correct mapping from
actions to payoffs in different states of the
world. But we allow agents’ assessments of
probabilities of different states to depart from
the objective probabilities.
This section deﬁnes our framework in two
steps. First, we describe the problem of the
agent given an arbitrary set of beliefs. At any
point in time agents maximize felicity, the
present discounted value of expected ﬂow util-
ities. Second, we deﬁne optimal expectations as
the set of beliefs that maximize well-being in
the initial period. Well-being is the expected
time-average of the agent’s felicity, and so is a
function of the agent’s beliefs and the actions
these beliefs induce.
A. Optimization Given Beliefs
Consider a canonical class of optimization
problems. In each period from 1 to T, agents
take their beliefs as given and choose control
variables, ct, and the implied evolution of state
variables, xt, to maximize their felicity. We con-
sider a world where the uncertainty can be de-
scribed by a ﬁnite number, S, of states.
4 Let
(sts t1) denote the true probability that state
st  S is realized after state history s t1 : (s1,
s2, ... , st1)  S t1. We depart from the ca-
nonical model in that agents are endowed with
subjective probabilities that may not coincide
with objective probabilities. Conditional and
unconditional subjective probabilities are de-
noted by  ˆ(sts t1) and  ˆ(s t), respectively, and
satisfy the basic properties of probabilities (pre-
cisely speciﬁed subsequently).
At time t, the agent chooses control variables,
ct, to maximize his felicity, given by
(1) E ˆUc1, c2, ... , cTs t
where U() is increasing and strictly quasi-
concave and E ˆ
t is the subjective expectations
operator associated with { ˆ} and given infor-
mation available at t. The agent maximizes sub-
ject to a resource constraint
(2) xt1  gxt, ct, st1,
(3) hxT1  0 and given x0,
where g() gives the evolution of the state vari-
able and is continuous and differentiable in x
and c, and h() gives the endpoint condition.
Denote the optimal choice of the control as
c*(s t,{  ˆ}) and induced state variables as x*(s t,
{ ˆ}).
While the agent’s problem is standard and
general, we employ the speciﬁc interpretation
that E ˆ[U()s t] is the felicity of the agent at time
t. The felicity of the agent depends on expected
future utility ﬂows, or “anticipatory” utility, so
that subjective conditional beliefs have a direct
impact on felicity. To clarify this point, consider
the canonical model with time-separable utility
ﬂows and exponential discounting. In this case,
felicity at time t,












is the sum of memory utility from past con-
sumption, ﬂow utility from current consump-
tion, and anticipatory utility from future
consumption.
B. Optimal Beliefs
Subjective beliefs are a complete set of con-
ditional probabilities after any history of the
event tree, { ˆ(sts t1)}. We require that subjec-
tive probabilities satisfy four properties.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Restrictions on probabilities):
(i) ¥stS  ˆ(sts t1)  1
(ii)  ˆ(sts t1)  0
(iii)  ˆ(s  t)   ˆ(s ts  t1) ˆ(s t1s  t2) ...  ˆ(s 1)
(iv)  ˆ(sts t1)  0 if (sts t1)  0.
4 Appendix A deﬁnes optimal expectations for the situ-
ation with a continuous state space.
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to one. Assumptions 1(i)–(iii) imply that the law
of iterated expectations holds for subjective
probabilities. Assumption 1(iv) implies that in
order to believe that something is possible, it
must be possible. That is, agents understand the
underlying model and misperceive only the
probabilities. For example, consider an agent
choosing to buy a lottery ticket. The states of
the world are the possible numbers of the win-
ning ticket. An agent can believe that a given
number will win the lottery. But the agent can-
not believe in the nonexistent state that she will
win the lottery if she does not hold a lottery
ticket or even if there is no lottery. Note that it
is possible for the agent to believe that a possi-
ble event is impossible. But since we specify
subjective beliefs conditional on all objectively
possible histories, as in the axiomatic frame-
work of Roger B. Myerson (1986), the agent’s
problem is always well deﬁned.
We further consider the class of problems for
which a solution exists and provides ﬁnite fe-
licity for all possible subjective beliefs.
ASSUMPTION 2 (Conditions on agent’s
problem):
E ˆUc* 1, c* 2, ... , c* Ts t  	 for all s t
and for all { ˆ}satisfying Assumption 1.
Optimal expectations are the subjective prob-
abilities that maximize the agent’s lifetime
happiness. Formally, optimal expectations max-
imize well-being, W, deﬁned as the expected
time-average of the felicity of the agent.
DEFINITION 1: Optimal expectations (OE) are
a set of subjective probabilities { ˆ
OE(sts t1)}
that maximize well-being





E ˆUc* 1, c* 2, ... , c* Ts t
subject to the four restrictions on subjective
probabilities (Assumption 1).
In addition to being both simple and natural,
this objective function is similar to that in Cap-
lin and Leahy (2000). Further, this choice of W
has the feature that, under rational expectations,
well-being coincides with the agent’s felicity,
so the agent’s actions maximize both well-being
and felicity. We further discuss these issues in
Section I C.
Optimal expectations exist if c
OE(s t) and
x
OE(s t) are continuous in probabilities  ˆ(sts t1)
that satisfy Assumption 1 for all t and s t1,
where c
OE(s t):  c*(s t,{  ˆ
OE}) and x
OE(s t): 
x*(s t,{  ˆ
OE}). This follows from the continuity
of expected felicity in probabilities and con-
trols, Assumption 2, and the compactness of
probability spaces. For less regular problems,
optimal expectations may or may not exist. As
to uniqueness, optimal beliefs need not be
unique, as will be clear from the subsequent use
of this concept.
Beliefs have an impact on well-being directly
through anticipation of future ﬂow utility, and
indirectly through their effects on agent behav-
ior. Optimal beliefs trade off the incentive to be
optimistic in order to increase expected future
utility against the costs of poor outcomes that
result from decisions made based on optimistic
beliefs.
How does this trade-off occur in practice?
One possible interpretation is that, at ﬁrst, indi-
viduals approach problems with overly optimis-
tic beliefs (“This paper will be easy to write”)
and then choose how much to restrain their
optimism by allocating scarce cognitive re-
sources to the problem—asking themselves
whether the probabilities of a good outcome are
really as high as they would like to believe
(“Am I sure writing this paper will not stretch
over years?”). As cognition is applied, proba-
bility assessments become more rational. We
posit that the amount of cognition is directly
related to the true risks and rewards of biased
versus rational beliefs (“I am hesitant to commit
to present the paper next week when I may not
have results—let me think about it”). This de-
scription is consistent with the view that human
behavior is determined primarily by the rapid
and unconscious processing of the limbic sys-
tem, but that for important decisions people rely
more on the slower, conscious processing of the
prefrontal cortex. This description also matches
many psychological experiments that ﬁnd that
agents report optimistic probabilities particu-
larly when these probabilities or their reports do
not affect payoffs. Probabilities tend to be more
accurate and beliefs more rational when agents
1096 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2005have more to lose from biased beliefs.
5 Our
optimal expectations framework is a simple
model that captures some elements of this
(and other) complex (and speculative) brain
processes.
We view these processes—the mapping from
objective to subjective probabilities—as hard-
wired and subconscious, not conscious. Thus,
while the interaction between optimistic and
rational forces can be viewed as a model of a
divided self, agents are unaware of this division
and of the fact that their beliefs may be biased.
This lack of self-awareness implies that agents
are unable to ﬁgure out the true probabilities
from the model and their subjective beliefs.
So far we have focused on the optimization
problem of a single agent. In a competitive
economy, each agent faces this maximization
problem taking as given his beliefs and the
stochastic process of payoff-relevant aggregate
variables. In our notation, xt
i includes the
payoff-relevant variables that agent i takes as
given, and so reﬂects the actions of all other
agents in the economy. Each agent has optimal
expectations that maximize equation (4), where
the states and controls are indexed by i, taking
the actions of the other agents as given. In
equilibrium, markets clear.
DEFINITION 2: A competitive optimal expec-
tations equilibrium is a set of beliefs for each
agent and an allocation such that
(i) Each agent’s beliefs maximize equation
(4), taking as given the stochastic process
for aggregate variables;
(ii) Each agent maximizes equation (1) subject
to constraints, taking as given his beliefs
and the stochastic process for aggregate
variables;
(iii) Markets clear.
Intuitively, optimal beliefs of each agent take as
given the aggregate dynamics, and the optimal
actions take as given the perceived aggregate
dynamics.
C. Discussion
Before proceeding to the application of op-
timal expectations, it is worth emphasizing
several points. First, because probabilities,
 ˆ
OE(sts t1), are chosen once and forever, the
law of iterated expectations holds with respect
to the subjective probability measure, and stan-
dard dynamic programming can be used to
solve the agent’s optimization problem. An al-
ternative interpretation of optimal conditional
probabilities is that the agent is endowed with
optimal priors over the state space,  ˆ
OE(s T), and
learns and updates over time according to
Bayes’s rule.
6 Thus, agents are completely
“Bayesian” rational, given what they know
about the economic environment.
Second, optimal expectations are those that
maximize well-being. The argument that is tra-
ditionally made for the assumption of rational
beliefs—that such beliefs lead agents to the best
outcomes—is correct only if one assumes that
expected future utility ﬂows do not affect
present felicity. This is a somewhat inconsistent
view: one part of the agent makes plans that
trade off present and expected future utility
ﬂows, while another part of the agent actually
enjoys utils but only from present consump-
tion.
7 Optimal expectations give agents the
highest average lifetime utility level under the
Jevonian view that the felicity of a forward-
looking agent depends on expectations about
the future.
To recast this point, we can ask what objec-
tive function for beliefs would make rational
expectations optimal. In the general framework,
this is the case if well-being counts only the
felicity of the agent in the last period, so that
W  E[U(c* 1, c* 2, ... , c* T)]. Alternatively, in the
canonical time-separable model, this is the case
if the objective function for beliefs omits antic-




Third, this discussion also makes clear why
well-being, W, uses the objective expectations
5 Sarah Lichtenstein et al. (1982) surveys evidence on
people’s overconﬁdence. Professionals such as weather
forecasters or those who produce published gambling odds
make very accurate predictions. Note also that the predic-
tions of professionals do not seem to be due to learning from
repetition (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982).
6 The interpretation of the problem in terms of optimal
priors requires that one specify agent beliefs following zero
subjective probability events, situations in which Bayes’
rule provides no restrictions.
7 See Loewenstein (1987) and the discussion of the Sam-
uelsonian and Jevonian views of utility in Caplin and Leahy
(2000).
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maximize the agent’s happiness only in the
states that the agent views as most likely. In-
stead, optimal beliefs maximize the happiness
of the agent on average, across repeated real-
izations of uncertainty. The objective expecta-
tion captures this since the actual unfolding of
uncertainty over the agent’s life is determined
by objective probabilities.
Fourth, the only reason for belief distortion is
that current felicity depends on expected future
utility ﬂows. There is no incentive to distort
beliefs to change actions. In fact, any change in
actions caused by belief distortion reduces well-
being. To see this, note that under rational ex-
pectations, the objective function for beliefs,W,
is identical to the objective function of the
agent, E[U]. Thus, ﬁxing beliefs to be rational,
the actions of the agent maximize well-being.
To clarify this point, consider a generalized
version of current felicity at time t with time-
separable utility and exponential discounting












where the agent discounts past utility ﬂows at
rate ,0	  	 1/.I f  1/, then this
example ﬁts into the framework we have as-
sumed so far; we refer to this case as preference
consistency. If  
 1, the agent’s memory utility
decays through time, which has more intuitive
appeal. In this case, however, an agent’s rank-
ing of utility ﬂows across periods is not time-
invariant under rational expectations (Caplin
and Leahy, 2000). Thus, there is an incentive to
distort beliefs in order to distort actions so as to
increase well-being. In Section IV we assume
time-separable utility and exponential discount-
ing. While the behavior of agents depends on ,
the qualitative behavior characterized by our
propositions holds for any  	 1/.
Fifth, one might be concerned that agents
with optimal expectations might be driven to
extinction by agents with rational beliefs. But
evolutionary arguments need not favor rational
expectations. Since optimal expectations re-
spond to the costs of mistakes, agents with
optimal expectations are harder to exploit than
agents with ﬁxed biases. Further, many eco-
nomic environments favor agents who take on
more risk (J. Bradford DeLong et al., 1990).
Finally, from a longer-term perspective and
consistent with our choice of W, there is a
biological link between happiness and better
health (Janice K. Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002;
Sheldon Cohen et al., 2003).
Before turning to the applications, we discuss
three generalizations of our approach. First, op-
timal expectations could be derived from a more
general objective function than a simple time-
average of felicities. In particular, an earlier
version of this paper deﬁned well-being as a
weighted average of the agent’s felicities.
Second, optimal subjective probabilities are
chosen without any direct relation to reality.
This frictionless world provides insight into the
behaviors generated by the incentive to look
forward with optimism when belief distortion is
limited by the costs of poor outcomes. In fact, it
may be that beliefs cannot be distorted far from
reality for additional reasons. At some cost in
terms of simplicity, the frictionless model can
be extended to include constraints that penalize
larger distortions from reality. Beliefs would
then bear some relation to reality even in cir-
cumstances in which there are no costs associ-
ated with behavior caused by distorted beliefs.
What sort of restrictions might be reasonable
to impose? One could require that belief distor-
tions be restricted to be “smooth” or lie on a
coarser partition of the probability space, so that
belief distortions are similar for states with sim-
ilar outcomes. Alternatively, one could restrict
the set of feasible beliefs to be consistent with a
set of parsimonious models. For example, the
agent might be able to bias beliefs only through
his belief about his own ability level. Or one
might require that the agent believe that his
income process is some ﬁrst-order Markov pro-
cess rather than allow belief distortions to be
completely history dependent.
8
8 If the agent were aware that his prior/model is chosen
from a set of parsimonious models, then he might question
these beliefs. In this case, it would make sense to impose the
additional restriction that only priors for which the agent
cannot detect the misspeciﬁcation can be chosen, an ap-
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discussion, we maintain the assumption that
conditional probabilities are ﬁxed through time.
As an alternative, one might consider beliefs as
being reset in each period to maximize well-
being given the new information that has ar-
rived. We describe the relationship between
these different approaches at the end of Section
IV B.
II. Portfolio Choice: Optimism and a Preference
for Skewness
In this section we consider a two-period in-
vestment problem in which an agent chooses
between assets in the ﬁrst period and consumes
the payoff of the portfolio in the second period.
We show that the agent is optimistic about the
payout of his own investment and prefers assets
with positively skewed returns. The subsequent
section places a continuum of these agents into
a general equilibrium model with no aggregate
risk, and shows that agents disagree and how
skewness affects asset prices.
A. Portfolio Choice Given Beliefs
There are two periods and two assets. In
period one, the agent allocates his unit endow-
ment between a risk-free asset with gross return
R and a risky asset with gross return R  Z (Z
is the excess return of the risky asset over
the risk-free rate). In period two, the agent
consumes the payoff from his ﬁrst-period
investment.
In period one, the agent chooses his portfolio
share, 
, to invest in the risky asset in order to








s.t. cs  R  
Zs,
cs  0
where u() is the utility function over consump-
tion, u0, u
0, u(0) 	 , and u(0) :
limcn0u(c). The second constraint, cs  0, also
holds for states with zero subjective probability
because the market requires that the agent is
able to meet his payment obligations in all fu-
ture states.
Uncertainty is characterized by S states with
ex post excess return Zs and probabilities s 
0 for s  1, ... , S. Let the states be ordered so
that the larger the state, the larger the payoff,
Zs1  Zs, Z1 
 0 
 ZS, and Zs  Zs for s 
s. Beliefs are given by { ˆ s}s1
S satisfying As-
sumption 1.
Noting that the second constraint can bind
only for the highest or lowest payoff state, the
agent’s problem can be written as a Lagrangian







 ˆ suR  
Zs  1R  
Z1
 SR  
ZS.





 ˆ suR  
*ZsZs  1Z1  SZS,
0  1R  
*Z1,
0  SR  
*ZS.
It turns out that optimal beliefs are never such
that cs  0 (or R  
*Zs  0) for any s.T os e e
this, suppose that R  
*Zs  0 for some s and
consider an inﬁnitesimal change in probabilities
that results in an increase of consumption in this
state. Since u(0) 	 , this causes an inﬁnite
marginal increase in well-being. Thus, optimal
expectations imply R  
*Zs  0 for all s.B y
complementary slackness, s  0 for all s, and
the optimal portfolio is uniquely determined by
(6) 0  
s1
S




Optimal beliefs are a set of probabili-
ties that maximize well-being, the expected
proach being pursued in the literature on robust control. By
not restricting the choice set over priors, we avoid these
complications.





1Uc*  E ˆ
2Uc*.
In period one, the agent’s felicity is the subjec-
tively expected (anticipated) utility ﬂow in the
future period; in period two, the agent’s felicity
is the utility ﬂow from actual consumption.
Substituting for our utility function and con-


















subject to the restrictions on probabilities (As-
sumption 1) and where 
*({ ˆ}) is given im-
plicitly by equation (6).
To characterize optimal beliefs, ﬁrst note that
 ˆ s
OE  0 for at least one state s with Zs 
 0
and one state s with Zs  0. If this were not the
case, the agent would view the risky asset as a
money pump, and would invest or short as
much of the asset as possible, so that cs  0 for
s  1o rf o rs  S, which contradicts our
previous argument. Now consider the ﬁrst-order
condition associated with moving d ˆ from the
low-payoff state s to the high-payoff state s,
where both states have positive subjective prob-
ability. By the envelope condition, small
changes in portfolio choice from the optimum
caused by small changes in subjective probabil-
ities lead to no change in expected utility, so
that this condition is
(7)
1











where us : u(R  
*Zs). The left-hand side is
the marginal gain in anticipatory utility in the
ﬁrst period from increasing  ˆ s at the expense of
 ˆ s; the right-hand side is the marginal loss in
expected utility in the second period from the
resultant change in the portfolio share of the
risky asset. At the optimum, the gain in antici-




RE denote the optimal portfolio choice
for rational beliefs. The following proposition,
proved in the Appendix, states that the agent
with optimal expectations is optimistic about
the payout of his portfolio. Further, the agent
with optimal expectations either takes a position
opposite that of the agent with rational beliefs or
is more aggressive—investing even more if the
rational agent invests, or shorting more if the
rational agent shorts.
PROPOSITION 1 (Excess risk taking due to
optimism):
(i) Optimal beliefs on average are biased up-
ward (downward) for states in which an













S ( ˆ s  s)uR  

OEZsZs  0.
(ii) An agent with optimal expectations invests
more aggressively than an agent with ra-
tional expectations or in the opposite
direction:




















if EZ  0 and S  2,
then 

RE  0 and 

OE  0.
To understand the ﬁrst part of the proposition,
note that marginal utility is always positive, and
1100 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2005(excess) payoff, Zs, is positive for large s and
negative for small s. Thus, when the agent is
investing in the asset (

OE  0), optimal expec-
tations on average bias up the subjective prob-
ability for positive excess return states at the
expense of negative excess return states.
The second part of the proposition character-
izes behavior. When the expected payoff is pos-
itive, E[Z]  0, the rational agent chooses to
invest in the asset, 

RE  0, since the expected
excess return on the risky asset is positive.
Starting from rational beliefs, again consider a
small increase in the probability of state s at the
expense of state s where ss. The left-hand
side of equation (2) shows that this leads to a
ﬁrst-order gain in anticipatory utility. The mar-
ginal cost of this distortion, shown on the right-
hand side of equation (2), is zero because the
cost of a small change in portfolio allocation
away from the rational optimum is only of
second order, as shown in equation (6). Thus,
{ ˆ





Further, the individual either invests more
than the rational agent in the risky asset or
shorts the risky asset for E[Z]  0, and vice
versa for E[Z] 
 0. Why would the agent take a
position in the opposite direction to the rational
agent when this implies that he is taking a
negative expected payoff gamble? This occurs
when anticipatory utility in the contrarian posi-
tion is sufﬁciently large. For many utility func-
tions, this is the case when the asset has the
properties similar to a lottery ticket, that is,
when the asset is skewed in the opposite direc-
tion of the mean payoff.
To illustrate this point, consider a world with
two states and an asset with negative expected
excess payoff, E[Z] : Z 
 0. We specify the
payoffs Z1 and Z2, such that, as we vary prob-
abilities, the mean and variance, Z
2, stay con-
stant, but skewness decreases in 2.
State Probability Excess Payoff
11  2 Z1  Z  Z
2
1  2
2 2 Z2  Z  Z
1  2
2
When the probability of the good state, 2,i s
small, the asset is similar to a real-world lottery:
the asset yields a small negative return with
high probability and a large positive return with
low probability. The following proposition
shows that agents with optimal expectations can
have a preference for skewness that is stronger
than their aversion to risk.
PROPOSITION 2 (Preference for skewness):
For unbounded utility functions, there exists
a   2 such that for all greater levels of
skewness, 2 
   2,( i) the agent is opti-
mistic about the asset,  ˆ 2
OE  2, and (ii)
invests in the asset, 

OE  0, even though
E[Z] 
 0.
If the agent were to short the asset when it is
very skewed, that is, when 2 is close to zero,
then  ˆ 2 
 2, and so 2   ˆ 2 is near zero—
subjective beliefs are necessarily near rational
beliefs—and 
*({ ˆ}) is near 

RE. In this case,
however, if the agent is optimistic about the
payoff of the risky asset,  ˆ 2  2, then he can
invest in the asset and dream about the asset
paying off well. This type of behavior—buying
stochastic assets with negative expected return
and positive skewness—is widely observed in
gambling and betting. The preference for
skewness may also explain the design of se-
curities with highly skewed returns such as
Russian, Belgian, and Swedish lottery bonds
and the German “PS-Lotteriesparen.”
9
Returning to Proposition 1(ii), when E[Z] 
0, the risky asset has the same expected return
as the risk-free asset, and the cost and beneﬁt of
a marginal change in beliefs from rational be-
liefs are both of second order. However, we
show for S  2 that the gains in anticipatory
utility always dominate the costs.
10 Hence,
{ ˆ
OE}  {} and the agent with optimal beliefs
holds or shorts an asset that a rational agent
would not. An implication is that, from the
9 Russia ﬁnanced the majority of its national debt in the
1870s using bonds with random maturities and lottery-type
coupon payments (Andrey D. Ukhov, 2004). Also, Swedish
lottery bonds make large coupon payments only to the
holders of a few randomly selected bonds. The German
“PS-Lotteriesparen” is a commitment savings plan with a
bank that includes a lottery. For example, at the national
network of savings banks (Sparkassen), one-ﬁfth of the
monthly savings is taken by the bank in exchange for
participation in their lottery for 10,000 euros.
10 When there are only two states and E[Z]  0, we




RE; in this case,
skewness is zero (both states are equally likely). We thank
Erzo Luttmer and Christian Gollier for this example.
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with optimal expectations holds an underdiver-
siﬁed portfolio. That is, there exists a portfolio
with the same objective expected return and less
objective risk since E[R  

OEZs]  E[R 


REZs] but Var[R  

OEZs]  Var[R  

REZs].
III. General Equilibrium: Endogenous
Heterogenous Beliefs
In this section we place the portfolio choice
problem into an exchange economy with iden-
tical agents and no aggregate risk. In an optimal
expectations equilibrium, agents choose to hold
idiosyncratic risk and gamble against one an-
other, even though perfect consumption insur-
ance is possible. These features match stylized
facts about asset markets. In addition, the price of
the risky asset may differ from that in an econ-
omy populated by agents with rational beliefs.
The economy consists of a continuum of agents
of mass one with the same utility function and
facing the same investment problem as in the
previous section. As before, there are two periods,
with S states in the second period. There is one
technology, bonds, that is risk free and gives nor-
malized gross return 1 (R  1). There is also an
asset in zero net supply, equity, which gives ran-
dom gross return 1  Z with realized returns 1 
Zs  (1  s)/P where P is the equilibrium price
of equity and 1 
 2 
 ... 
 S. Each agent i is
initially endowed with one unit of bonds. Since
equity is in zero net supply, Cs  i cs
idi  1i n
all states s.
Agent i takes her beliefs, { ˆ s
i}, and the price
of equity, P, as given, and chooses her portfolio
















As before, the ﬁrst-order conditions for portfo-
lio choice deliver a unique optimal portfolio
share:


























subject to the restrictions on probabilities (As-
sumption 1), where c* s({ ˆ





i}) is given by equation (8). Note
that, since Zs  [(1  s)/P]  1, optimal
beliefs and asset demand depend on P.
An optimal expectations equilibrium is a set
of beliefs and an allocation of assets character-
ized by each agent holding beliefs that maxi-
mize her well-being subject to constraints, and
market clearing. Letting OE denote values in an
optimal expectations equilibrium (e.g., Z
OE 
[(1  )/P
OE]  1) and RE denote values in a
rational expectations equilibrium, we have the
following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3 (Heterogeneous beliefs and
gambling):
(i) An optimal expectations equilibrium
exists.
(ii) For S  2, agents have heterogenous
priors such that some agents hold the
risky asset and some agents short the
risky asset:
• there exists a subset of the agents, I,
such that for all i  I, j  I,
{ ˆ
OE,i}  { ˆ














RE  0, { ˆ
OE,i}  {} for
all i.
Since there is no aggregate risk, in the ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium, no agent holds
any of the risky asset and all agents have the
same consumption in all states. In contrast, in an
optimal expectations equilibrium, agents have
heterogeneous beliefs and some agents hold the
asset and some short it. Consequently, agents
gamble against each other and choose to bear
consumption risk.
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following example with only two states: u(c) 
[1/(1  )]c
1 with   3, 1  0.25, 2 
0.75, 1  0.6, 2  0.2. We choose the risky
asset to have negative skewness, like daily re-
turns on the U.S. stock market. The rational
expectations equilibrium has P
RE  1 so that
E[Z]  0 and no agent holds the risky asset. At
this price, because the payoff of the asset is
negatively skewed, agents with optimal expec-
tations would be pessimistic about the payout of
the asset and short the asset. This is shown in
Figure 1; the dashed line plots well-being, W,
as a function of  ˆ 2 for the rational expectations
price, P  1. At this price, the market for the
risky asset does not clear because demand is too
low.
At lower prices, E[Z]  0, and Proposition 1
implies that agents with optimal expectations
either hold more of the asset than the agent with
rational expectations or short the asset. If the
price were far below P
RE, then the asset would
have such a high expected return that it would
be optimal for all agents to be optimistic about
the return on the asset and to hold the asset (the
dotted line in Figure 1), so again the market
would not clear. The unique optimal expecta-
tions equilibrium occurs at a price of 0.986. At
this equilibrium price, each agent holds one of
two beliefs, each of which gives the same level
of well-being. These correspond to the two local
maxima of the solid line in Figure 1. One set of
agents has optimistic beliefs about the return on
the asset and holds the asset ( ˆ 2
OE,i  0.82 and


OE,i  0.19); the remaining agents have pes-




OE,j  0.67). The market for the risky
asset clears when 78 percent of the agents are
optimistic and the remaining 22 percent are
pessimistic. No agents hold rational beliefs.
From an economic perspective, an interesting
result in this example is that the optimal expecta-
tions equilibrium has a 1.4-percent-higher equity
premium than the rational expectations equilib-
rium. In the example, the more negatively
skewed the asset, the greater is the equity pre-
mium. For the case in which the asset is posi-
tively skewed, by symmetry of the problem,
P
OE  P
RE. For the knife-edge case in which
the asset is not skewed (1  0.5 and 1 
2), agents hold rational expectations and the
optimal expectations price is equal to the ratio-
nal expectations price. But this result is quite
speciﬁc to this example, since by Proposition 1,
this is not the case if S  2 or if there is
aggregate risk.
This negative relationship between skewness
and expected returns is also observed more gen-
erally, and in almost the exact setting we study,
in the payoffs and probabilities in pari-mutuel
betting at horse tracks. As in our example, in
pari-mutuel betting there is no aggregate risk
and there are risky assets. The longer the odds
on a horse, the more positively skewed is the
payoff. Joseph Golec and Maurry Tamarkin
(1998) document that the longer the odds the
FIGURE 1. WELL-BEING AS A FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVE BELIEFS
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alently, the higher the price of the asset. More
generally, initial public offerings (IPOs) of
stock have both low (risk-adjusted) return and
positive skewness during the ﬁrst year follow-
ing public trading.
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To summarize, when returns are positively
skewed, as in pari-mutuel betting or the IPO
example, our model predicts lower expected
returns than the rational model; when returns
are negatively skewed, as in the U.S. stock
market, our model predicts higher expected re-
turns than the rational model.
It is also worth noting that in an optimal
expectations equilibrium there is signiﬁcant
trading volume, while there is no trade in the
rational expectations equilibrium. Further, there
is more trading when the asset is more skewed.
This is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in
Joseph Chen et al. (2001). We note the caveat
that the choice of endowments drives this result.
Finally, let us speculate about a setting with
heterogeneous endowments. In such a setup, it
is natural to pick an equilibrium in which agents
are more optimistic about the payoffs of their
initial endowments. This choice minimizes trad-
ing. Interpreting endowment as labor income,
the model suggests that most agents are opti-
mistic about the performance of the companies
they work in or the countries they live in.
Hence, investors overinvest in the equity of
their employer and of their country relative to
the predictions of standard rational models, con-
sistent with the data (see, for example, James
M. Poterba, 2003, on pension underdiversiﬁca-
tion and Karen K. Lewis, 1999, on the home
bias puzzle).
IV. Consumption and Saving over Time:
Undersaving and Overconﬁdence
This section considers the behavior of an
agent with optimal expectations in a multi-
period consumption-saving problem with sto-
chastic income and time-separable, quadratic
utility. We show that the agent overestimates
the mean of future income and underestimates
the uncertainty associated with future income.
That is, the agent is both unrealistically optimis-
tic and overconﬁdent. This is consistent with
survey evidence that shows that the growth rate
of expected consumption is greater than that of
actual consumption. We also use this example
to make four general points about the dynamic
choices of agents with optimal expectations.
A. Consumption Given Beliefs
In each period t  1, ... , T the agent chooses
consumption to maximize the expected dis-
counted value of utility ﬂows from consumption












ct  yt  At
where u(ct)  act  (b/2)ct
2 , initial
wealth A1  0, a, b  0, R  1, and yt denotes
the history of income realizations up to t. The
agent’s felicity at time t is given by equation
(5), so that the agent has time-separable utility
and discounts the future and the past exponen-
tially. Equation (5) allows the rate at which past
utility ﬂows are discounted, , to differ from the
inverse of the rate at which future ﬂows are
discounted, . We note again that the choice of
 does not affect the agent’s actions given
beliefs.
The only uncertainty is over income. In-
come, yt, has cumulative distribution function
(ytyt1) with support [y, y ] and d(yt)  0
for all y  Y where 0 
 y 
 y  
 a/(bT). We
assume income is independently distributed
over time, and so (ytyt1)  (yt). Agents
can believe, however, that income is serially
dependent, so subjective distributions are de-
noted by  ˆ (ytyt1).
Assuming an interior solution, the necessary
conditions for an optimum imply the Hall Mar-
tingale result for consumption, but for subjec-
tive beliefs
(9) c* t  E ˆc* t1yt.
11 See Jay Ritter (1991). Alon Brav and James B. Heaton
(1996) and Nicholas C. Barberis and Ming Huang (2005)
derive a preference for IPOs that are skewed from the
exogenous probability weighting (“decision weights”) of
prospect theory. Gollier (2005) shows how the overweight-
ing of extreme events—assumed by prospect theory—is an
endogenous outcome of optimal expectations.
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gives the optimal consumption rule










Optimal consumption depends on subjective ex-
pectations of future income, and on the history
of income realizations through At. Because qua-
dratic utility exhibits certainty equivalence in
the optimal choice of consumption, the subjec-
tive variance (and higher moments) of the in-
come process are irrelevant for the optimal
consumption-saving choices of the agent. Only
the subjective means of future incomes matter.
B. Optimal Beliefs
Optimal expectations maximize well-being
subject to the agent’s optimal behavior, given
beliefs and the restrictions on expectations. As-
sumption 1 in Appendix A states the restric-
tions on expectations for a continuous state
space. We incorporate optimal behavior directly
into the objective function and characterize con-
sumption choices, {ct
OE}, implied by optimal
beliefs. Optimal beliefs, E ˆOE and { ˆ OE}, imple-
ment these consumption choices given optimal
behavior on the part of the agent.
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Since the objective is a sum of utility func-
tions, it is concave in future consumption. And
since the agent’s behavior depends only on the
subjective certainty-equivalent of future in-
come, optimal beliefs minimize subjective un-
certainty. Thus, future income is optimally
perceived as certain, which is an extreme form
of overconﬁdence.
Using the fact that optimal beliefs are cer-
tain and the consumption Euler equation,
E ˆ[u(c* t)yt]  u(E ˆ[c* tyt])  u(c* t), the agent’s
felicity at time t can be written as











Subjective expectations are chosen to yield the






















uc* T  uc* T
E ˆ UT
*yT ,
subject to the budget constraint. Collecting












Notice that, regardless of , the average con-
sumption path of agents is not constant. Only if
the objective for beliefs were to ignore antici-
patory utility and memory utility (  0) so that
t  
t1 would beliefs be rational and the
expected consumption path standard.
Under optimal expectations, the ﬁrst-order
condition implies that expected consumption








which, substituting for the quadratic utility
function, implies that
12 In taking this approach, we are assuming that the optimal
choice of consumption and thus E ˆOE[ytyt] does not require
violation of Assumptions 1 (iv), which can be checked. That
is, if the support of yt is small, belief distortion may be
constrained by the range of possible income realizations. To
incorporate these constraints directly, one would solve for
optimal E ˆ[ytyt] by replacing c*(yt,{  ˆ OE}) using equation
(10) and impose Assumption 1.











Level consumption is recovered by substituting
into the budget constraint and taking objective
conditional expectations.
Given this characterization of optimal be-
havior, agents are optimistic at every time
and state. Deﬁne human wealth at t as the
present value of current and future labor in-
come, Ht  ¥0
Tt R
yt.
PROPOSITION 4 (Overconsumption due to
optimism): For all t  {1, ... , T  1}:
(i) On average, agents revise down their
expectation of human wealth over time:
E ˆOE[Ht1yt]  E[E ˆOE[Ht1yt1]yt];




(iii) Agents are optimistic about their future
consumption: E ˆOE[ct1
OE yt]  E[ct1
OE yt].
The ﬁrst point of the proposition states that
agents overestimate their present discounted
value of labor income and on average revise
their beliefs downward between t and t  1. The
second point states that consumption on average
falls between t and t  1. Because on average
the agent revises down expected future income,
on average, consumption falls over time. The
proof follows directly from the expected change
in consumption given by equation (12) and not-
ing that (a/b)  ct
OE(yt)  0 and (t1/t)R 

1. Finally, the optimal subjective expectation of
future consumption exceeds the rational expec-
tation of future consumption. This is optimism.
Part (iii) follows from part (ii) and equation (9).
In sum, households are unrealistically optimis-
tic and, in each period, are on average surprised
that their incomes are lower than they expected;
so, on average, household consumption declines
over time.
Figure 2 summarizes these results qualita-
tively. The agent starts life optimistic about
future income. At each point in time the agent
expects that on average consumption will re-
main at the same level. Over time, the agent
observes on average that income is less than he
expected, and consumption typically declines
over his life. Note that the agent updates his
beliefs according to { ˆ }, but does not learn over
time that { ˆ } is incorrect because he does not
know that his income is identically and indepen-
dently distributed over time. The agent merely
observes one realization of income at each age and
(on average) believes that he was unlucky.
While quadratic utility makes this example
quite tractable, the agent’s overconﬁdence is
extreme. Before each period the agent is certain
about what his future income will be, and this
FIGURE 2. AVERAGE LIFE-CYCLE CONSUMPTION PROFILES
1106 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2005belief is contradicted by the realization. But, as
seen in equation (10), less extreme overconﬁ-
dence would not alter consumption choices,
only reduce the agent’s felicity early in life.
This optimism matches survey evidence on
desired and actual life-cycle consumption pro-
ﬁles. Robert Barsky et al. (1997) ﬁnd that
households would choose upward-sloping con-
sumption proﬁles. But survey data on actual
consumption reveal that households have down-
ward-sloping or ﬂat consumption proﬁles
(Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Parker, 2002;
Orazio Attanasio, 1999). In our model, house-
holds expect and plan to have constant marginal
utility since R  1  0. On average, however,
marginal utility rises at the age-speciﬁc rate
(t/t1)  1  0. Thus, in the model, the
desired rate of increase of consumption exceeds
the average rate of increase, as in the real world.
In addition, the model matches observed house-
hold consumption behavior in that average life-
cycle consumption proﬁles are concave—
consumption falls faster (or rises more slowly)
later in life.
In general, in consumption-saving problems,
the relative curvatures of utility and marginal
utility determine what beliefs are optimal. Un-
certainty about the future enters the objective
for beliefs both through the expected future
level of utility and through the agent’s behavior,
which depends on expected future marginal
utility. For utility functions with decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion, greater subjective uncer-
tainty leads to greater precautionary saving
through the curvature in marginal utility. This
has some beneﬁt in terms of less distortion of
consumption. In such cases, optimal beliefs
may consist of a positive bias for both expected
income and its variance.
We conclude this section by using our con-
sumption-saving problem to make four points
about the dynamic choices of agents with opti-
mal expectations. First, given that in expecta-
tion the consumption of the agent is always
declining, the costs of optimism early in life
could be extreme for long-lived agents. But,
illustrating a general point, optimal expectations
depend on the horizon in a way that mitigates
these possible costs. The behavior of an agent
with a long horizon is close to that of an agent
with rational expectations. For large but ﬁnite T,
an agent with optimal expectations consumes a
small amount more for most his life, leading to
a signiﬁcant decline in consumption at the end
of life. As the horizon becomes inﬁnite, at any
ﬁxed age, the consumption choice of the agent
with optimal beliefs converges to that of the
agent with rational beliefs, as the subjective
expectation of human wealth converges to the
rational expectation. As shown in Appendix
B.6, for any t,a sT 3 	, ct
OE(yt) 3 ct
RE(yt),
E ˆOE[Ht1yt] 3 E[Ht1yt], and ct
OE(yt) 3
E[ct1
OE (yt1)yt]. Beliefs become more rational
as the stakes become larger.
Second, an agent with optimal expectations
may choose not to insure future income when
offered an objectively fair insurance contract.
Formally, let the agent face an additional binary
decision in period one: whether or not to ex-
change all current and future income for B 
E[H1y1]. A rational agent would always take
this contract, while the agent with optimal ex-
pectations may choose not to insure consump-
tion. Interestingly, since beliefs affect whether
the agent insures or not, the addition of the
possibility of insurance may change what be-
liefs are optimal.
Optimal expectations are either the beliefs
that maximize well-being conditional on induc-
ing the agent to reject the insurance, or the
beliefs that maximize well-being conditional on
inducing the agent to accept the insurance. The
former are the optimal expectations from Prop-
osition 4. These beliefs are optimal for the prob-
lem without the constraint, and the agent rejects
the insurance because both income streams are
perceived as certain and E ˆ[H1y1]  E[H1y1] 






with c* characterized by equation (12). The latter,
optimal beliefs conditional on accepting the insur-
ance, are irrelevant for well-being, provided that
the agent believes that E ˆ[H1y1] is small enough
and/or the process for {y} uncertain enough that he
accepts the insurance.







13 While nothing formally requires this, it seems natural
to assume that expectations are rational in this case.
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Risk determines which expectations are opti-
mal. Well-being decreases in objective income
risk when the agent rejects the insurance, while
it is invariant to risk if he accepts the insurance.
If objective income risk is small, then the cost of
distorted beliefs—variable future consumption—
is small, and optimal expectations are optimis-
tic. If objective income risk is large, optimal
expectations are more rational and induce the
agent to insure his future income.
Third, at the start of life the agent facing the
problem with the option to insure income may
have a lower level of felicity than the agent
facing the problem without this option. Infor-
mally, we might think of an agent approaching
life blithely optimistic about the future. Given
no choice of insurance, this is indeed optimal. If
placed in an environment with large amounts of
income risk, however, an agent given the op-
portunity to insure considers his life more real-
istically, puts more weight on possible bad
states of the world, and chooses insurance.
Since c
OE(y1)  c
FI(y1), the agent who has and
accepts the option to insure is less happy
initially.
14
Finally, what if beliefs were chosen in each
period to maximize well-being? Suppose that
the agent in each period chooses his actions
taking as given his own beliefs in the future,
which are possibly different. The agent’s felic-
ity is the present discounted value of utility
ﬂows evaluated using his own subjective be-
liefs. This can be viewed as if the agent in each
period were a different self that knows the con-
ditional beliefs of his future selves. The well-
being function for optimal beliefs at time t
would then be W
t : E[(1/T) ¥1
T E ˆ[U(c* 1,
c* 2, ... , c* T)s ]s t] where E ˆ[ s ] denotes the be-
liefs of the agent at time  under this alterna-
tive assumption. E ˆt[ s ] maximizes W
t given
{E ˆ[ s ]}t and the future decision rules that
these beliefs induce.
Because the objective function changes
through time, typically it is not the case that the
agent updates probabilities according to Bayes’s
law. That is, E ˆt[ s ] varies across an agent’s
selves in different periods t 
 . In the appli-
cation of this section, however, an agent’s
selves agree.
PROPOSITION 5 (Time consistency of beliefs):
In this consumption-saving problem, optimal
expectations are time consistent: E ˆOE,t[ s ] is
independent of t for all possible histories and
  t.
This result obtains here because of the ex-
tremity of overconﬁdence. Consider ﬁrst the
choice of beliefs at time t following an event at
t  s, viewed subjectively as having zero prob-
ability. These beliefs do not inﬂuence either the
actions or anticipatory utility of the agent at
time t; they inﬂuence only the actions and an-
ticipatory utility of the agent at time t  s. Thus,
beliefs following realizations of income other
than the expected one are chosen simply to
maximize the expected utility of that agent in
that period. The perspective from which one
chooses these optimal beliefs is irrelevant. If the
income realization matches the expected level,
then consumption remains constant, and the
agent continues to hold the certain beliefs that
they held in the previous period (by Bayes’s
law). Note that this argument pins down the
proﬁle of optimal income expectations, E ˆ[yt],
which increases in a pattern opposite the aver-
age consumption proﬁle, E[ct].
V. Conclusion
This paper introduces a model of utility-
serving biases in beliefs. While our applications
highlight many of the implications of our the-
ory, many remain to be explored.
First, the speciﬁcation of possible events
seems to be more important in a model with
optimal expectations than it is in a model with
rational expectations. For example, an optimal
expectations equilibrium in a world with only
certain outcomes is different from the equilib-
rium in the same world with an available sun-
spot or public randomization device. With the
randomization device, agents can gamble
against one another.
Second, agents with optimal expectations can
be optimistic about uncertain events, and there-
fore can be better off with the later resolution of
uncertainty. For instance, you tell someone that
14 On average, the agent who has and accepts the option
to insure has greater levels of felicity later in life. This is
because lifetime well-being with the option to insure is
greater than or equal to lifetime well-being without the
option.
1108 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2005he is going to receive gifts on his birthday but
you do not tell him what those gifts are until the
birthday.
15 More generally, because more infor-
mation can change the ability to distort beliefs,
agents can be better off not receiving informa-
tion despite the beneﬁts of better decision mak-
ing. However, without relaxing the assumptions
of expected utility theory and Bayesian updat-
ing, agents would not choose that uncertainty be
resolved later because agents take their beliefs
as given.
Third, we conjecture that the agent who faces
the same problem again and again, and so faces
the possibility of large losses from an incorrect
speciﬁcation of probabilities, will, in our frame-
work, have a better assessment of probabilities.
Thus, optimal expectations agents are not easy
to turn into “money pumps,” although they may
exhibit behavior far from that generated by ra-
tional expectations in one-shot games.
Fourth, and closely related, to what extent do
optimal beliefs give an evolutionary advantage
or disadvantage relative to rational beliefs? On
the one hand, agents with optimal expectations
make poorer decisions. On the other hand,
agents with optimal expectations may take on
more risk, which can lead to an evolutionary
advantage.
Finally, optimal expectations has promising
applications in strategic environments. In a stra-
tegic setting, each agent’s beliefs are set taking
as given the reaction functions of other agents.
APPENDIX
A. Optimal Expectations When the State Space Is Continuous
In the main text, we deﬁne optimal expectations when the state space is ﬁnite and discrete. To
consider random variables with continuous distributions, we extend our deﬁnitions. Let {S T, F, }
denote the state space, -algebra, and objective probability measure. Let F  {F0, ... , FT}b ea
ﬁltration. Let { ˆ } and E ˆ denote the subjective probability measure and expectation, respectively.
First, agent optimization given continuously distributed random variables is standard. Second, it is
mathematically simpler to state the restrictions on subjective beliefs in terms of subjective condi-
tional expectations. Thus, one solves for optimal expectations by choosing E ˆ[AFt] for any Ft in the
ﬁltration F and any event A  S T to maximize the functional objective and Assumption 1 is replaced
by
ASSUMPTION 1 (Restrictions on probabilities for a continuous state space): For every Ft  F:
(i) E ˆ[S TFt]  1
(ii) E ˆ[fFt]  0 for any nonnegative function f :S T  R which is Ft-measurable
(iii) E ˆ[AFt]  E ˆ[E ˆ[AFt]Ft] for any   0 and any event A
(iv)  is a dominating measure of  ˆ .
B. Proofs of Propositions
B1. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Part (i): We prove the case for 

OE  0; the case for 

OE 





the asset pays off poorly, marginal utility is higher (lower) for the agent with the higher (lower) share
invested in the risky asset:
(A1) uR  

OEZs  uR  

REZs for s such that Zs 	 0
uR  

OEZs  uR  

REZs for s such that Zs  0.
Combining this with the ﬁrst-order condition of the agent with rational expectations,
15 A surprise party for an agent raises the possibility in
the agent’s mind that he might get more surprise parties in
the future, and he enjoys looking forward to this possibility.

























OE  suR  

OEZsZs  0.
Thus, if we can show that 





RE the proof of (i) is complete. This follows from
the second point of the proposition, which we now prove.
Part (ii): The proof of the sign of 

RE in each case is standard and omitted. We ﬁrst treat the case
of E[Z]  0 and 

RE  0, the case of E[Z] 
 0 and 

RE 
 0 is analogous, and we treat E[Z]  0
and 

RE  0 subsequently.
We show that an agent with arbitrary beliefs invests more in the risky asset (or shorts it
less) as the subjective probability of a state s with Zs  0 is increased relative to a state s
with Zs 
 0. Examine the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition for 
* and consider moving d ˆ from
s to s:
0  uR  
*ZsZs  uR  
*ZsZsd ˆ  
s1
S






d ˆ  
uR  









since the denominator is negative and Zs  0  Zs.





RE. As in the proof of part (i), we have
uR  

OEZs 	 uR  

REZs for s  Zs 	 0
uR  

OEZs  uR  

REZs for s  Zs  0







Now to establish the contradiction, the ﬁrst-order condition for beliefs, equation (7), implies










*/d ˆ)  0 and equation (A3), the sign of the right-hand side is strictly negative, while the
fact that we are assuming 

OE  0 implies that us  us and the left-hand side is strictly positive,






OE 	 0. The ﬁnal step is to rule out 

OE  0. If


OE  0 then (us  us)  0, so that by the ﬁrst-order condition for beliefs








OE  0 cannot solve equation (A4) because equation (A4) is the same as the ﬁrst-order
condition for the optimal portfolio choice of the rational agent, and the objective of the rational agent
is globally concave with a unique 

RE satisfying equation (A4).
Finally, we prove that when E[Z]  0 and 

RE  0, 





OE  0, which occurs if and only if E ˆOE[Z]  0. These beliefs actually satisfy the
ﬁrst-order condition for optimal expectations because (a) there is no gain to the marginal belief
distortion since us  us and (b) starting from 

RE the ﬁrst-order cost of a small change in optimal
portfolio choice is zero. We show, however, that the second-order condition is violated for some
beliefs such that E ˆ[Z]  0, which means that there is a deviation from this set of beliefs that increases
well-being and therefore 

OE  0.
The second-order condition for the same d ˆ that moves an inﬁnitesimal probability from s to s,
where Zs  0, Zs 
 0, and  ˆ s  0, is
d
2W





























Since W is linear in probabilities, (d



















  u sZs  u sZs.
We evaluate this second-order condition for { ˆ} such that E ˆ[Z]  0 so that 
*  0 and u and u
are independent of s, yielding
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2W
d ˆd ˆ 

















d ˆ  u 
s1
S
























































S  ˆ sZs
2 and E ˆ[Z]  0 has (d
2W/d ˆd ˆ)  0, and so there exists a deviation that increases
well-being, completing the proof. This ﬁnal step requires S  2; for S  2, the second-order









occurs only for S  2, Z1  Z2, and 1  2  1⁄2 .
B2. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
To avoid arbitrage we consider only 1 large enough such that Z2  0. We show that as 1 3 1,
well-being when investing in the asset is higher than when shorting the asset. We do this by con-
structing a lower bound for well-being when investing in the asset (W
(1)) and an upper bound
when shorting the asset (W
(1)) and showing that lim13	W
(1)  lim13	W
(1). Deﬁne
well-being as a function of subjective and objective beliefs, given optimal agent behavior, as
W ˆ 1; 1 :
1
21   ˆ 1uR  
*Z1 
1
22  1   ˆ 1uR  
*Z2
where Zs  Zs(1), and 
*  
*( ˆ 1; Z1(1), Z2(1)).
Step 1: lim131W(  )  	 for 
  0.
Consider an optimistic belief,  ˆ 1,0
  ˆ 1 
 1, such that the agent invests in the asset, 
0.
Since  ˆ may be suboptimal, well-being with this belief is a lower bound for the well-being of the
agent conditional on 
  0. Deﬁne W
(1):  W( ˆ 1; 1) 	 W( ˆ 1
OE(1), 1). Taking the limit

















2 1   ˆ 1uR  
Z 
1





1112 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2005since Z1 3 Z, Z2 3 	 and limc3	u(c) 	 .
Step 2: lim131W(  )  	 for 
 
 0.
Deﬁne an upper bound for well-being by choosing the portfolio and subjective beliefs subject only
to the conditions that the agent shorts the asset, that the agent is pessimistic about the payout, and







1   ˆ 1uR  








(1) is an upper bound since we do not restrict 
 to be the optimal agent’s choice given  ˆ 1. The
optimal  ˆ 1  1, and the ﬁrst and third constraints become (R/Z2) 	 
 	 0 (which is not the null











1  1uR  





1311  1uR 
R
Z2Z1  1  1uR  uR
where the second line follows from substituting the best portfolio choice in each state separately and
lim131(Z1/Z2)  0.
The proof follows from lim131W
(1)  lim131W
(1) and Proposition 1.
B3. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Part (i): Write the well-being of an agent as a function of subjective beliefs and the price given
{} and optimal agent behavior:













This function is well-deﬁned for the set of prices and beliefs such that the agent chooses positive
consumption in every state. Denote this set M.I nM the function W is continuous in prices and
subjective probabilities because 
* is continuous in subjective probabilities and prices. M is not
closed, but we now show that P
OE and all { ˆ
OE} do not lie outside M or in the set
{Closure(M)M}. First, consider prices such that the lowest payoff Z1  0 or the highest payoff
ZS 	 0. In this case, all agents would have an identical arbitrage opportunity for any possible
subjective beliefs, except possibly for  ˆ 1  1o r ˆ S  1. Hence, this cannot constitute an equilibrium
because agents would all choose to buy or all choose to short the risky asset, and so the market for
the risky asset would not clear. Thus, the equilibrium price must lie on the interior of the set P 
(1  1,1 S). Second, consider beliefs such that an agent chooses cs  0 for some s. Because
u(0) 	in some state, a marginal increase in  ˆ 1 or  ˆ S leads to cs  0 for all s, and results in an
inﬁnite increase in well-being.
We will argue that at a low enough price, W({ ˆ }, P) is maximized by beliefs such that
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*  0, and at a high enough price, W({ ˆ }, P) is maximized by beliefs such that
E ˆ[Z]  0 and 
* 
 0. Then, by continuity of W({ ˆ }, P), either at some intermediate price there
are multiple global maxima, some with E ˆ[Z]  0 and some with E ˆ[Z]  0, or at some
intermediate price there is a unique global maximum with E ˆ[Z]  0 and 
*  0. By Proposition
1, this second alternative cannot occur for S  2. Thus, for S  2, the unique equilibrium in
which markets clear has a fraction of agents believing E ˆ[Z]  0 and shorting the asset and a
fraction of agents believing E ˆ[Z]  0 and buying the asset. The fractions are such that the
aggregate demand for the asset is zero.
We now show that there exists a low enough price such that optimal beliefs always induce the
agent to buy the asset. We do this by showing that, for a low enough price, an upper bound on the
well-being of an agent who shorts the asset is lower than the well-being of an agent with rational
beliefs, who buys the asset. Consider an agent who shorts the asset and consider lower and lower
prices for the asset. Since the agent shorts, he must believe E ˆ[Z] 	 0. As P n 1  1, E ˆ[Z] 	 0
implies  ˆ 1 m 1 and Z1 m 0, so that
lim
Pn11





























2 u1  u1
where the inequality follows from the fact that in the limit the risky asset becomes dominated by the
risk-free asset. For P 
 ¥s1
S s(1  s), we have E[Z]  0, and so, for an agent with rational beliefs,
well-being is






*  0. Since the rational agent chooses 
 to maximize his objective, 
* yields higher utility
than 






Thus, there is a low enough price such that the beliefs that maximize the well-being
function have E ˆ[Z]  0 and 
*  0. The problem is symmetric, so that there is a completely





Part (ii): The proof for the rational expectations equilibrium is standard and omitted.
For E[Z













S s(1  s))  0 where 

RE(P
OE) denotes the portfolio choice of an agent who
has beliefs equal to the objective probabilities and faces the optimal expectations equilibrium price
of equity. By market clearing, and since agents either short or hold the asset, some agents must be
shorting and some agents must be holding the asset, which implies the result. Again by Proposition
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OE)  0o r

OE,i 









OE,i}  {}. Again, by market clearing and since agents either short
or hold the asset, some agents must be shorting and some agents must be holding the asset, which
implies the result. The case of E[Z
OE]  0 is analogous.
B4. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Part (ii): Subtract E[ct1




















Since the support of the income process does not admit a plan such that E[ct
OEyt]  a/b for any ,







































OE yt  0
and we have the result.
Part (iii): From the agent’s consumption Euler equation
E ˆct1
OE yt  ct
OE  Ect1
OE yt
where the inequality follows from part (ii).






Tt At1  E ˆHt1yt1
where Ht1  ¥0
Tt1 R
yt1. From part (iii) we have
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Tt At1  E ˆHt1yt1yt
and by the law of iterated expectations
E ˆHt1yt  EE ˆHt1yt1yt.
B5. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5

















Thus, optimal beliefs from the perspective of any time period imply the same rationally expected
percent change in the proﬁle of marginal utility between any two periods. Since the budget constraint
determines the level of the proﬁle and all plans exhaust the resources, the levels are necessarily the
same. Since income is perceived as certain, if that income actually occurs, beliefs are bound by
Bayes’ rule. In this case, there is no change in beliefs about future incomes, and the subjective
expectation of consumption coincides with actual consumption.
B6. PROOF OF CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR AS T 3 	
It can be seen that c1
OE 3 c1
RE by taking conditional expectations of the budget constraint and
repeatedly substituting E[ct
OEyt], for all , from the Euler equation (12) to solve for c1
OE, and noting
that (t/t)R
 3 1a sT 3 	 and (t/t)R
 
 t for , T 3 	. This together with equation
(10) implies that E ˆ OE[H2y1] 3 E[H2y1]. Again, using the fact that (t/t)R
 3 1a sT 3
	, equation (12) implies that for ﬁnite t, ct
OE 3 ct
RE, so that the ﬁrst two results also hold for
any ﬁnite t (not just t  1).
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